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BANKRUPTCY—MIMSY WERE THE BOROGOVES: A “RIDE
THROUGH” THE LOOKING GLASS WITH THE 2005 BANKRUPTCY
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
INTRODUCTION
“‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scorn
ful tone, ‘it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor
less.’”1
“‘The question is’, said Alice, ‘whether you can make words
mean so many different things.’”2
Such is the dilemma faced by courts both prior to and after
enactment of 2005’s Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (BAPCPA).3 Interpreting the statute’s meaning
may at times feel like trying to interpret the words uttered by the
Mad Hatter in Lewis Carroll’s beloved book. BAPCPA’s purpose
was to end abuse of the bankruptcy system and, purportedly, to
help consumers.4 Yet BAPCPA appears to have ended one of the
easiest ways for consumer debtors to keep their vehicles when they
file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, at least if that debtor was lucky
enough to live in a jurisdiction that allowed auto loans that were
not in default to “ride-through” a Chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding.5
Prior to BAPCPA’s passage, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Ap
peals was split regarding the options available to Chapter 7 debtors
wishing to retain their automobiles.6 The debate over this issue
1. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND
THERE (1871), reprinted in ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND THROUGH THE
LOOKING-CLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 125, 188 (Elibron Classics 2001).
2. Id.
3. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 109
8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
4. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2-3, 10-18 (2005) (“The purpose of [BAPCPA]
. . . is to . . . ensure that the system is fair for both debtors and creditors.”).
5. The “ride-through” option, even in circuits that allowed it, was only available
to debtors who were current on their loan payments. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379
(3d Cir. 2004); In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d
43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed.
Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989).
6. The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits did not allow the “ride
through” option. See, e.g., In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re John
son, 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re
657
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centered on the language found in section 521(2) of the Bankruptcy
Code.7 This language, depending upon how the deciding court in
terpreted it, offered either three or four options for debtors wanting
to retain their vehicles.8 In circuits that offered debtors three
choices, a debtor had to reaffirm,9 redeem,10 or surrender11 her ve
hicle.12 In circuits that allowed the so-called “fourth option,” how
ever, debtors had the additional alternative of ignoring the three
above-listed options and continuing to make payments on their ve
hicles as they had prior to filing for Chapter 7.13 This fourth option
is popularly known as the “ride-through.”
Section 521(2) of the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code clearly
spelled out the three options of reaffirmation, redemption, or sur
render.14 The issue that perplexed courts was whether a debtor was
limited to one of these three options. Courts split over the language
of the statute, which required the debtor to choose one of these
options “if applicable.”15 Depending on each court’s interpretation
of the statute, debtors in different jurisdictions had different rights.
This did not lend itself to the uniformity promised by Article I SecEdwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990). The Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits did allow the “ride-through” option for Chapter 7 debtors. See, e.g.,
In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673; In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51;
In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347; Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d at 1547; In re Bell,
700 F.2d 1053 (6th Cir. 1983).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
8. Id.
9. Reaffirmation is an agreement made between a debtor and a creditor in which
the debtor is allowed to keep the collateral in exchange for promising to repay a debt
that would otherwise be discharged during bankruptcy. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
1378 (9th ed. 2009).
10. A debtor “redeems” his vehicle by paying the outstanding balance owing on
the collateral. Id. at 1390.
11. “Surrender” is just what it sounds like: the debtor chooses to give up the
collateral. Id. at 1581.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).
13. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 (3d Cir. 2004); In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668,
673 (9th Cir. 1998); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Belanger, 962
F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547
(10th Cir. 1989).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).
15. Id. § 521(2)(A) (stating that “the debtor shall file . . . a statement of his inten
tion with respect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applicable, speci
fying . . . that the debtor intends to redeem such property, or that the debtor intends to
reaffirm debts secured by such property” (emphasis added)); see In re Price, 370 F.3d at
375; In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Parker, 139 F.3d at 673; In re
Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249, 252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3
F.3d 1512 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348; In re Edwards, 901 F.2d
1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990); Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d at 1547.
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tion 8 of the Constitution, which promises “uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”16 The
debtor was to choose one of the specified options “if applicable.”17
But when did this choice become applicable? If the debtor chose to
keep the car? Or only if the debtor chose to keep the car by re
demption or reaffirmation?
This Note will examine how BAPCPA has affected debtors and
creditors, and how the “ride-through” option has been a source of
contention in determining their rights and responsibilities. Section
I will examine the options available to debtors prior to BAPCPA.
Section II will give an overview of how BAPCPA came to be and
how it has affected consumer debtors in general. Section III will
examine how BAPCPA has affected the “ride-through” option for
Chapter 7 debtors and how courts have interpreted the Code using
plain language and legislative purpose. This Note proposes that it is
time for the courts to be less deferential to the text of the statute,
and to reach an interpretation of its provisions that is consistent
with both the text and the purpose of the Act. Such a common
sense approach is necessary to reach a consistent body of law that
debtors, creditors, and courts can rely on.
I. DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: A LOOK AT THE OPTIONS
AVAILABLE TO DEBTORS WISHING TO KEEP THEIR
VEHICLES BEFORE BAPCPA
The Bankruptcy Code that was enacted prior to BAPCPA
spelled out three options available to Chapter 7 debtors having se
cured loans.18 Debtors could surrender their property, redeem it,
or reaffirm their agreement with the secured lender.19 When the
secured property at issue was the debtor’s car, it was often very
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A).
18. In Chapter 7 bankruptcy, debtors, upon approval, are able to discharge their
debt and begin with a clean slate. See 11 U.S.C. § 727. All of the debtor’s property
goes into a bankruptcy estate, and a trustee liquidates the debtor’s assets, using the
proceeds to pay creditors. Id. § 704. A debtor may, however, redeem or reaffirm the
debt on certain property. See generally id. §§ 722, 524(c). When a debtor grants a se
curity interest in collateral to a creditor, which is essentially a lien on the property, this
is a secured loan. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009). In Chapter 13 bank
ruptcy, debtors do not liquidate their assets, but instead commit to a payment plan in
which their disposable income is used to pay off their debts for a specified number of
years. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322.
19. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2).
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important to the debtor not to lose it.20 However, redeeming the
vehicle was impossible for most debtors filing for bankruptcy.21
Reaffirming with the secured lender was a possibility, though not a
right; secured lenders could refuse to reaffirm the loan with the
debtor.22 Alternatively, the secured lender could offer terms that
were harsher than the original terms of the contract.23
A. Not Applicable? Confusion Over the Alternatives
Section 521(2)(A) of the pre-BAPCPA Code stated, “the
debtor shall file with the clerk a statement of his intention with re
spect to the retention or surrender of such property and, if applica
ble, specifying . . . that the debtor intends to redeem such property,
or that the debtor intends to reaffirm debts secured by such
property.”24
Courts allowing the “ride-through” based their decisions on
the plain language of the statute,25 the perceived notice-giving func
tion of section 521,26 the lack of remedy if a debtor did not choose

20. See, e.g., In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 216 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting that
“debtors desperately desire to retain their vehicles and that they will continue making
their regular payments because transportation is such a crucial element for a ‘fresh
start’”); see also Jean Braucher, Rash and Ride-Through Redux: The Terms for Holding
on to Cars, Home, and Other Collateral Under the 2005 Act, 13 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 457, 522, 526-30 (2005) [hereinafter Rash and Ride-Through Redux].
21. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a debtor’s
only real choices would be either to reaffirm the debt under whatever new terms the
creditor requires or to surrender the property”); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th
Cir. 1992) (stating that debtors would be “unlikely to be able to redeem the collateral in
a lump sum”).
22. See In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 348 (stating that “reaffirmation requires the
consent of the creditor in order to comply with [section] 524(C)”).
23. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51 (stating that “[b]ecause reaffirmation in
volves negotiation between parties with unequal bargaining power and requires volun
tary agreement by both debtor and creditor, it gives a creditor an effective veto on the
‘fresh start’”).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A) (emphasis added).
25. In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 379 (3d Cir. 2004); see also In re Parker, 139 F.3d
668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that “[w]e see no reason to reach beyond this plain
language”); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347.
26. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; see also In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 50-51 (finding
that § 521(2) is meant to provide notice, not to confine debtor to listed options); In re
Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347.
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one of the listed options,27 and the “fresh start”28 policy behind
bankruptcy law in general.29
Section 521(2) of the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code clearly
required a debtor to file a statement of intention and to perform
this intention with respect to secured debts.30 But if a debtor chose
to keep his car, when did the options of redemption or reaffirma
tion become “applicable”? Five circuits held that the words “if ap
plicable” meant that the debtor was not confined to the options of
surrender, redemption, or reaffirmation.31
The Second Circuit recognized the dilemma facing debtors,
who, by virtue of filing for bankruptcy, would be unlikely to have
the funds available to redeem their automobile.32 In In re Bood
row, Mr. Boodrow filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition, and, pur
suant to section 521(2), he timely filed a statement of intention that
indicated his plan to continue making payments on the car.33 The
credit union that had given Mr. Boodrow the loan claimed that Mr.
Boodrow was not in compliance with section 521(2), since he did
not choose one of the three options specifically articulated.34 The
lender, Capital Communications Federal Credit Union (hereinafter
Capital), wanted to repossess the car and moved to have the auto
matic stay lifted.35 Capital further contended that it had the right to
accept or reject a debtor’s attempted reaffirmation, and that it
should have the opportunity to negotiate an agreement on new
terms.36
27. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; see also Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882
F.2d 1543, 1546 (10th Cir. 1989) (“Congress provided neither a penalty for a debtor’s
failure to comply with § 521(2) nor a specific remedy for a creditor as a consequence of
such a failure.” (footnote omitted)).
28. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1934) (noting that the
purpose of bankruptcy is helping debtors to achieve a “fresh start”).
29. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 378 (determining that “we believe that our reading
comports best with the ‘fresh start’ policy of the Code”); In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
31. In re Price, 370 F.3d at 379; In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998); In
re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51; In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347; Lowry Fed. Credit Union,
882 F.2d at 1547.
32. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51.
33. Id. at 45.
34. Id. at 46.
35. Id. The automatic stay becomes effective when a debtor files for bankruptcy,
and it bars all collection efforts aimed at the debtor of any kind. See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1548 (9th ed. 2009). Its purpose is to “protect[ ] a debtor’s assets during
the administration of a bankruptcy case.” In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 46.
36. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 49.
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The court concluded that “[section] 521(2)(A) was intended
specifically to eliminate the problem that secured creditors could
not determine what a debtor who had filed for bankruptcy was go
ing to do with collateral securing a debt,” thus agreeing with other
circuits and allowing the “ride-through” as a fourth, unspecified,
option.37 In reaching its decision, the court also looked at the pol
icy behind the Bankruptcy Code.38 Specifically, the court stated
[t]he policy embodied in the Code that a debtor discharged from
bankruptcy should receive a “fresh start” has been emphasized
time and again by the Supreme Court and this court . . . . Confin
ing an individual Chapter 7 debtor to the choices of surrender,
redemption or reaffirmation can severely interfere with provid
ing the debtor a fresh start . . . . Thus, if the options listed in
[section] 521(2) were exclusive, a debtor’s only real choices
would be either to reaffirm the debt under whatever new terms
the creditor requires or to surrender the property. Because reaf
firmation involves negotiation between parties with unequal bar
gaining power and requires voluntary agreement by both debtor
and creditor, it gives a creditor an effective veto on the “fresh
start.” Yet, surrender may deprive a debtor of much needed
property, such as disabled debtor Boodrow’s vehicle in this
case.39

Circuits finding that there existed a “ride-through” option also
found other sections of the Code to lend support to their position.
Section 521(2)(C) stated that sections 521(2)(A) and (B), requiring
debtors to state their intention and perform their stated intention,
would not “alter the debtor’s . . . rights with regard to such property
under this title.”40 Courts allowing the “ride-through” interpreted
this to mean that those sections were notice-giving only; these
courts also found section 521(2)(C) “to be of enormous aid in [the
interpretation] of section 521(2)(A),” reading sections 521(2)(A)
and (B) as “not . . . impinging on the substantive rights guaranteed
by other provisions.”41 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that, since
prior to the enactment of section 521(2) at least one bankruptcy
court had held that a debtor who was current on his payments could
continue making those payments without resorting to redemption
or reaffirmation, and since section 521(2)(C) did “not alter the
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(C) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (2006).
In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
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debtor’s rights with regard to the collateral,” the bankruptcy court
could allow debtors this same option.42 Otherwise, the court con
cluded, the section would alter a debtor’s rights.43
B. Applicable Indeed—No Other Options Available
Other circuit courts held that no “ride-through” option ex
isted.44 These courts read the “if applicable” language of section
521(2) to mean that if a debtor chose not to surrender the property,
then he must choose either redemption or reaffirmation, as these
were then “applicable.”45 Further, in interpreting section
521(2)(C), these courts decided that a right to keep property by
remaining current on the existing agreement was not one of the
“substantive rights guaranteed.”46 Despite bankruptcy’s policy of
giving debtors a “fresh start,” some courts refused to allow a “ride
through” that would give debtors a “head start” by allowing se
cured loans to become nonrecourse loans for which the debtor as
sumed no personal liability.47 The Eleventh Circuit, for example,
found “[n]othing in the plain language of the statute provides a
debtor with an option to retain the property and to continue to
make payments.”48 It found no reason, then, to allow a debtor this
“head start” in which “the debtor effectively converts his secured
obligation from recourse to nonrecourse with no downside risk for
failing to maintain or insure the lender’s collateral.”49
The First Circuit joined those circuits that did not allow the
“ride-through” option for debtors.50 When James and Katherine
Burr sought to keep their three-year-old minivan without paying a
lump sum or entering into a new formal new agreement with their
42. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1992); see 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)
(2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
43. In re Belanger, 962 F.2d at 347.
44. See In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 847-48 (1st Cir. 1998); In re Johnson, 89 F.3d 249,
252 (5th Cir. 1996); In re Taylor, 3 F.3d 1512, 1516 (11th Cir. 1993); In re Edwards, 901
F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990).
45. See, e.g., In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 848 (“[Congress] intended chapter 7 debtors
to elect surrender or retention, and then, ‘if’ retention is ‘applicable,’ to specify which of
the following . . . retention options they intend to employ.”).
46. Id.
47. In re Taylor, 3 F.3d at 1516. In a nonrecourse loan, the creditor would be able
to repossess the collateral in the event the debtor stopped making payments or other
wise violated the agreement (such as by failure to maintain insurance), but in the likely
event that the collateral fetched a price lower than the amount still owed under the
agreement, the lender would have no remedy against the debtor. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 849.
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lender, First National Bank of Boston (hereinafter the Bank),
sought to compel them to choose one of the listed options.51 The
Burrs had not fallen behind on their payments to the Bank, despite
financial difficulties that caused them to file a Chapter 7 petition.52
The Bank sought relief from the automatic stay in the event that
the Burrs failed to select reaffirmation, redemption, or surrender of
the minivan.53
Siding with the dissenting opinion in Boodrow, the court
agree[d] that it . . . [was] perfectly good English[ ] for Congress to
have phrased [section] 521(2)(A) in the way it did because it in
tended chapter 7 debtors to elect surrender or retention, and
then, “if” retention is “applicable,” to specify which of the fol
lowing three retention options they intend to employ.54

After all, the court reasoned, “it would be the rare debtor in
deed who would elect reaffirmation or redemption over the un
stated fourth option, which neither requires a large lump sum
payment . . . nor resuscitates personal liability for the underlying
debt.”55 In light of the fact that this “unspecified . . . option . . .
would be almost universally employed” if it were allowed, the court
reasoned that Congress would not have been silent about it.56
In addition, the First Circuit Court of Appeals stressed “that a
chapter 7 discharge is a benefit that comes with certain costs.”57
We do not doubt that redemption is beyond the means of most
chapter 7 debtors, and that chapter 7 debtors wishing to retain
consumer goods on which they owe money will, as a practical
matter, be compelled to enter into reaffirmation agreements with
their secured creditors. Nor do we doubt that some . . . creditors
may use their superior bargaining power to attempt to impose
additional, creditor-friendly terms in any new agreement. But
strictly speaking, debtors are never “forced” to enter into reaffir
mation agreements; they can always surrender the property and
be discharged of the underlying debt.58
51. Id. at 844.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 848; see also In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 57-58 (2d Cir. 1997) (Shadur,
J., dissenting).
55. In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 847.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 848.
58. Id.
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The court also reasoned that the Burrs could not perform this
fourth option within forty-five days, as required by section
521(2)(B).59 While section 521(2)(A) required a debtor to state his
intentions, section 521(2)(B) required a debtor to “perform his in
tention with respect to such property” within forty-five days.60
Since it was impossible for the Burrs to finish paying by installment
under the original agreement terms within forty-five days, this
clearly was not an option contemplated by the statute.61 The Burrs,
unlike Mr. Boodrow, could not use the “ride-through.”
Finally, the First Circuit addressed the issue of voluntariness.
If a debtor fails to choose one of the three options, the court noted
that involuntary surrender is perceived as a contradiction to the
protection offered by the automatic stay.62 The court was uncon
cerned, however, because it recognized “that most secured creditors
in circumstances such as these will prefer to enter reaffirmation
agreements containing identical terms to the old agreements over
the costs associated with accepting back, and then disposing of, sur
rendered collateral.”63 The court did acknowledge that it “perhaps
would have cause for concern if, in fact, the effect of [this section]
were that most debtors were forced to surrender their collateral.”64
C. The Importance of the “Ride-Through” Debate to Debtors
and Creditors
The controversial “ride-through” benefitted debtors in several
ways. First, it allowed debtors to keep their vehicles on the same
terms as they had prior to filing.65 This was important for many
reasons. It kept creditors from preying on debtors’ fear of losing
59. Id. at 847; 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(B) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(B)
(2006).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A)-(B) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A)-(B)
(2006).
61. In re Burr, 160 F.3d at 847.
62. See id. at 848.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 462. In jurisdictions
allowing “ride-through,”
so long as a debtor remains current on a secured debt and meets other obliga
tions, such as insuring and maintaining the collateral, the bankruptcy court will
not lift the automatic stay and allow the creditor to repossess or foreclose on
the collateral merely because the debtor’s personal liability on the debt will be
erased by bankruptcy.
Id.
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their transportation by raising the interest rates on their loans.66
Debtors were often willing to accept harsh terms for the sake of
keeping their cars67 because getting to work and taking care of a
family are easier with an automobile.68 Debtors who lost their cur
rent vehicle might have a hard time getting financing for another
vehicle if they lost their current one, as lenders would not look fa
vorably on the bankruptcy.69
Although reaffirmation might be a hardship, debtors often
fight to prove that they are able to make their car payments.70
Even when consumers owe more than the vehicle is worth, they
frequently reaffirm their debt.71 In Coastal Federal Credit Union,
for example, debtors, the Hardimans, owed $20,000 on a Chevrolet
only worth $9,000 due to depreciation.72 The family, which in
cluded three children, did not wish to lose “their only reliable
means of transportation.”73 Because their other debts were being
discharged, the family “thought they could make the monthly pay
ments on the Chevrolet. [They] acknowledged, however, that it
would be hard sometimes.”74 In deciding that it was not in the
Hardimans’ best interest to reaffirm their agreement with the credi
tor, the court nevertheless allowed the Hardimans to keep the

66. See In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 378 (3d Cir. 2004) (stating that without the
“ride-through” option, “debtors would either have to accept possibly onerous terms set
by the creditor or surrender the property”).
67. See, e.g., In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211, 213-14 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (debtor
agreed to pay $15,438 on his vehicle that had a value of $8,415, at an interest rate of
15.6%); see also Jean Braucher, Lawyers and Consumer Bankruptcy: One Code, Many
Cultures, 67 AM. BANKR. L.J. 501, 522, 526-30 (1993) (noting that debtors employ vari
ous means in attempting to hold on to collateral).
68. See, e.g., In re Lorenz, 368 B.R. 476, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (noting
debtor needed vehicle for “travel[ing] to and from work,” and “shopping for groceries,”
among other everyday tasks).
69. See William C. Whitford, Consumer Bankruptcy and Credit in the Wake of the
2005 Act: A History of the Automobile Lender Provisions of BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L.
REV. 143, 145 (“One important reason [why a debtor will want to retain their vehicle] is
that the debtor, with an impaired credit rating, can expect difficulty replacing a repos
sessed vehicle with a vehicle of similar quality.”).
70. See, e.g., Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 166 (E.D.
N.C. 2008) (indicating that even though the debtors showed a negative net monthly
income, they tried to reaffirm their debt on the car).
71. Id. at 166; In re Husain, 364 B.R. at 213-14 (debtor agreed to pay $15,438 on
his vehicle that had a value of $8,415, at an interest rate of 15.6%).
72. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 165.
73. Id. at 166.
74. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
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Chevrolet as long as they continued making their payments and
complied with other requirements, such as maintaining insurance.75
Creditors had several complaints about the unfairness of the
“ride-through” option. Debtors keeping their property by means of
“ride-through” were no longer personally liable for these debts.76
While lenders did not lose their right to repossess the property if
the debtors stopped paying, they had no recourse if the property
was damaged or destroyed.77 Creditors were therefore forced into
an involuntary and unfavorable new agreement.78 In a voluntary
reaffirmation, debtors still would be personally liable despite their
discharge in bankruptcy. Moreover, if debtors did not like the
terms the lender offered in this voluntary reaffirmation, they could
file under Chapter 13, instead.79 Creditors, such as Capital, argued
that a debtor without personal liability on the loan would have “no
incentive to maintain the collateral in good condition or to continue
making payments if the value of the collateral drops below the
amount outstanding on the loan.”80 The court in Boodrow agreed
with the debtor, however, who argued that “there is a great incen
tive . . . to maintain current on the debt and to preserve the auto
since he has no means to acquire another auto.”81 Courts allowing
75. Id.
76. See In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d 43, 52 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that “a debtor’s
discharge from bankruptcy eliminates personal liability on the loan, thereby theoreti
cally limiting the amount a creditor could recover if the debtor defaults”).
77. See In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that “[w]hen a
debtor is relieved of personal liability on loans secured by collateral, the debtor has
little or no incentive to insure or maintain the property in which a creditor retains a
security interest”); Michael P. Alley, Redemption, Reaffirmation, Exemption, and Re
tention in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: Extinction Looms Near for the Free Ride, 47 U. KAN.
L. REV. 683, 687 (1999).
[T]he collateral . . . may be in good saleable condition at the time the debtor
files for Chapter 7 protection. If the debtor subsequently defaults after the
bankruptcy case closes and the collateral has rapidly depreciated through the
neglect of a disinterested debtor, secured lenders lose their best opportunity to
sell the collateral at a favorable price and apply the proceeds against the debt.
Id.
78. See Ned W. Waxman, Redemption or Reaffirmation: The Debtor’s Exclusive
Means of Retaining Possession of Collateral in Chapter 7, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 187, 203
(1994) (stating that creditors are forced “into a new [involuntary] contractual arrange
ment” that gives the creditor no protection in the case of the debtor’s default).
79. See In re Burr, 160 F.3d 843, 848 (1st Cir. 1998). Chapter 13, however, re
quires a debtor to commit their disposable income for a specified time period to paying
back their debts, offering less of a “fresh start.” See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)
(2006).
80. In re Boodrow, 126 F.3d at 51.
81. Id. at 52 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the “ride-through” were less than sympathetic to creditors’
protests.82
II.

BAPCPA—IT’S NO WONDERLAND

Given that this disagreement created a circuit split lasting fif
teen years,83 when BAPCPA was enacted it was a logical opportu
nity for Congress to clarify and definitively state whether it
intended to allow the “ride-through” or not.84 Congress, however,
failed to take advantage of this opportunity.85 The “if applicable”
language remained in the new Code.86 Once again, courts were left
to decipher the statute with inadequate guidance. Once again, Con
gress’s intent was unclear.87 Once again, consumers were faced
with a nonuniform application of Bankruptcy law.

82. Id.; see also In re Carpinella, 201 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996).
Once a debtor’s discharge is entered and the subject collateral ceases to be
property of the bankruptcy estate, the secured creditor can freely exercise the
same rights against its collateral that it possessed prior to the bankruptcy filing
. . . in accordance with [its] agreements and applicable non-bankruptcy law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
83. See Lowry Fed. Credit Union, 882 F.2d 1543, 1547 (10th Cir. 1989) (first deci
sion to allow the “ride-through”); In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1386 (7th Cir. 1990)
(denying the existence of this fourth option).
84. See Chadwick M. Werner, Still Applicable: An Examination of BAPCPA’s
Perplexing Response to the Ride-Through Debate, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 ART. 3
(2007).
It seemed a mere matter of time before this widespread circuit split would be
sorted out by the Supreme Court. Congress, however, beat the court to it . . .
or so it seemed. While it appears that Congress may have sought to settle the
issue by amending the language of section 521, it unfortunately did little more
than add fuel to the fire.
Id. (alteration in original).
85. See generally Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act,
Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. § 101).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2006).
87. See In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 528-29 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
Unfortunately, the BAPCPA amendments do not provide a clear answer. The
amendments are confusing, overlapping, and sometimes self-contradictory.
They introduce new and undefined terms that resemble, but are different
from, established terms that are well understood. . . . Deciphering this puzzle
is like trying to solve a Rubik’s Cube that arrived with a manufacturer’s defect.
Id. at 529.
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A. Congress Attempts Bankruptcy Reform
Congress made several attempts to update the Bankruptcy
Code before finally enacting BAPCPA in 2005.88 In 1997, the “Re
sponsible Borrower Protection Bankruptcy Act” was introduced.89
This Act “set out the rudimentary elements of means testing90 for
consumer debtors as well as other provisions protective of con
sumer creditor interests.”91 While means testing was not a new
idea,92 these attempts at reform show Congress’s growing concern
for the rights of creditors. The fact that bankruptcy filings were
increasing throughout the 1990s may have influenced this trend.93
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998 was introduced in the
House in February of that year.94 Many witnesses testified at the
hearings on this reform, including the Consumer Bankruptcy Re
88. See Susan Jensen, A Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (2005). The Na
tional Bankruptcy Review Commission was formed in 1994. Id. Its purpose was to
(1) investigate and study issues and problems relating to the Bankruptcy Code;
(2) evaluate the advisability of proposals and current arrangements with re
spect to such issues and problems; (3) prepare and submit to Congress, the
Chief Justice, and the President a report within two years; and (4) “solicit di
vergent views of all parties concerned with the operation of the bankruptcy
system.”
Id. (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N. (108 Stat.) 4106, 4147). This Commission issued a report containing rec
ommendations for changes to the 1978 Bankruptcy Code. National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 54-55 (1997). “The conceptual
framework of some of these recommendations was ultimately reflected in BAPCPA
. . . .” Jensen, supra note 87, at 487.
89. H.R. 2500, 105th Cong. (1997); Jensen, supra note 88, at 493.
90. Means testing, which is a method for calculating income to determine who is
eligible to file Chapter 7 and who must file Chapter 13, was eventually introduced by
BAPCPA. See Jean Braucher, A Fresh Start for Personal Bankruptcy Reform: The Need
for Simplification and a Single Portal, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1295, 1307 (2006) [hereinafter
A Fresh Start]; Jensen, supra note 88, at 493.
91. Jensen, supra note 88, at 493.
92. In 1932, President Herbert Hoover proposed that “[t]he discretion of the
courts in granting or refusing discharges should be broadened” to give more protection
to creditors. Jensen, supra note 88, at 490 (quoting President’s Special Message to the
Congress on Reform of Judicial Procedure, 69 Pub. Papers 83, 90 (Feb. 29, 1932)).
93. Jensen, supra note 88, at 495. Representative George W. Gekas (R-PA), testified that “[t]he bankruptcy crisis is epidemic. A record 1.3 million or more Americans
are expected to declare bankruptcy this year, more than double the number a decade
ago . . . .” Id. (citing National Bankruptcy Review Commission Report: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judici
ary, 105th Cong. 2-3 (1997)).
94. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. (1998); Jensen,
supra note 88, at 496.
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form Coalition, comprising many consumer creditors, such as banks
and finance companies, which “would play a major role in the effort
to effect consumer bankruptcy reform.”95 Meanwhile, the Senate
was also working on its own legislation in this area.96 The House
and Senate worked together to reconcile the two acts, but while the
House adopted the amended version, the Senate failed to take ac
tion before Congress adjourned.97
A year later, Congress took up bankruptcy reform once again,
introducing the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999.98 Lawmakers
supporting this Act were motivated by “the increase in bankruptcy
filings, perceived loopholes in the law that encourage abuse, the
need to ‘reinstill a sense of personal responsibility,’ and the cost of
abusive bankruptcy filings.”99 A later version of this Act was even
tually vetoed by President Clinton, who cited concerns over the
lack of balance in holding debtors and creditors accountable; Con
gress adjourned without overriding the veto.100
President Bush signed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act into law on April 20, 2005.101 Interest
ingly, some commentators felt “the bankruptcy community, the
bench and the bar, were effectively shut out of this particular bank
ruptcy bill.”102 Critics agree that the Act was poorly drafted, lead
ing to “greater interpretive challenges” than under the prior Act.103
95. Jensen, supra note 88, at 499. This coalition “also obtained the services of
some of the most prominent lobbyists in Washington, D.C. to make its case to Con
gress.” Id.
96. S. REP. NO. 105-253 (1998); Jensen, supra note 88, at 512.
97. Jensen, supra note 88, at 513-18; see S. REP. NO. 105-253.
98. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 833, 106th Cong. (1999); see Jensen,
supra note 87, at 519.
99. Jensen, supra note 88, at 519-20 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999-Part I: Hearing on H.R. 833 Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 32 (1999)) (state
ment of Rep. Steven Rothman (D-NJ)).
100. Id. at 539; see Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong.
(1999).
101. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
102. Symposium, Old Code, New Code: Views on Bankruptcy From the Bench
and Bar: Panel 3: BAPCPA: What Do We Know and When Did We Know It?, 4
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 597, 597 (2006) (also referring to the Act as “BAP
CRAPA”); see also A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1305 (“[C]redit industry lobbyists
and their most dedicated supporters in Congress knew that opening up the drafting
process would provide an opportunity for rethinking policy choices, so even the legisla
tion’s typos and technical flaws were not addressed.”).
103. George H. Singer, The Year in Review: Case Law Developments Under the
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 82 N.D. L. REV.
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B. The 2005 Act and Its Effect on Consumer Debtors
When BAPCPA was finally passed in 2005, it changed the land
scape for creditors and consumers. To illustrate the overall effect of
the Act, this Note will briefly discuss general changes to the Bank
ruptcy Code and how these changes have affected those filing. Fil
ings spiked shortly before BAPCPA went into effect,104 presumably
because people feared the effect BAPCPA would have on their
ability to file.
1. General Changes that Adversely Affect Debtors
Many of BAPCPA’s changes illustrate the “Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention” aspect of the Act. Supporters of the new Act claimed
that this new test, introduced in BAPCPA, was to benefit debtors as
well as creditors by stopping the majority of debtors from paying
the increased costs of credit caused by those abusing the system.105
In the pre-BAPCPA Bankruptcy Code, section 707(b) stated,
“[t]here shall be a presumption in favor of granting the relief re
quested by the debtor.”106 This sentence does not appear in the
new version.107 Further, section 707(b) in its older form required
the court to find “substantial abuse” of the system as one reason for
a court to dismiss a bankruptcy case.108 BAPCPA merely requires
the court to find “abuse,” a presumably easier standard to meet.109
Another important change introduced by BAPCPA affects re
peat filers—those debtors who file for bankruptcy more than once
within a given year.110 Section 362(c)(3) shortens the reprieve
granted a debtor by the automatic stay that takes effect when a
297, 304 (2006). Singer goes on to state that this is “due to the imprecise language
frequently utilized by Congress and other drafting issues that do not in many cases
clearly articulate Congressional intent.” Id.
104. Press Release, Chapter 7 Bankr. Filings in Mass. Soar to Highest Level in
Four Years, THE WARREN GRP. (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.thewarrengroup.com/por
tal/Solutions/PressReleases/tabid/190/newsid751/2350/Default.aspx. Bankruptcy filings
are back up to their highest level in four years in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Id.
105. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S1855. According to Sen. Grassley, sponsor of the
means test, the implementation of this test would prevent “high rollers who game the
current bankruptcy system and its loopholes to get out of paying their fair share.” Id.
This causes other “hard-working, law-abiding Americans . . . to pay higher prices . . .
because somebody else did not make good on their obligations.” Id. at S1856.
106. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2000) (amended 2006).
107. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 707(b) (2006).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(3).
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debtor files for bankruptcy.111 In both Chapter 7 and Chapter 13
cases, if the debtor has filed another bankruptcy case within one
year of the current case, the automatic stay, rather than being in
effect until discharge or dismissal, terminates thirty days from the
time of filing.112 A debtor may avoid this early lifting of the auto
matic stay if he can show that the previous filing was done in good
faith, and not in an attempt to merely hold off creditors.113 If a
debtor files three or more times within the year, no automatic stay
goes into effect at all unless the debtor can show he filed in good
faith.114 Although debtors were more likely to be repeat filers in
order to keep secured creditors at bay with respect to real estate,
repeat filers were detrimental to automobile lenders as well, be
cause they increased administrative costs.115
In the name of consumer protection, BAPCPA requires debt
ors to undergo a course on financial management.116 This and
other requirements for credit counseling117 “are intended to give
consumers in financial distress an opportunity to learn about the
consequences of bankruptcy—such as the potentially devastating
effect it can have on their credit rating . . . .”118 There is debate,
however, on whether this requirement can really help a debtor who
is already seriously considering bankruptcy.119
111. Id. § 362(c)(3)(A).
112. Id.
113. Id. § 362(c)(3)(B).
114. Id. § 362(c)(4)(A)(i) and 362(c)(4)(B).
115. See Whitford, supra note 69, at 152-53.
Not only were lenders hindered by the automatic stay if they were to seek
repossession, but each time a debtor filed a bankruptcy case the lender in
curred an administrative expense: the lender had to note the existence of the
case in appropriate company records, so that the lender did not inadvertently
violate the automatic stay, and had to file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy
court. For this reason most importantly, the expected impact of BAPCPA on
the number of refilings, especially chapter 13 refilings, should significantly
benefit auto lenders.
Id. at 153 (footnote omitted).
116. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 109(h) (2006).
117. Id. §§ 101, 109(h), 526-28.
118. H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18 (2005).
119. See Jean Braucher, A Guide to Interpretation of the 2005 Bankruptcy Law,
16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 349, 365-66 (2008) [hereinafter A Guide to
Interpretation].
Credit counseling might work for more debtors if they could get it earlier,
before their debt loads become unmanageable, but the required briefing
comes too late, typically after a debtor visits a bankruptcy lawyer . . . and
learns of the requirement. By this time, most debtors already are in deep debt

R
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2. BAPCPA’s Effect on Chapter 13
Although this Note focuses mainly on BAPCPA’s impact on
Chapter 7 debtors wishing to retain their vehicles, it is important, in
order to fully appreciate how BAPCPA has changed the playing
field for debtors and creditors, to briefly discuss how Chapter 13
filings were also affected by the 2005 Act. Prior to BAPCPA’s en
actment, Chapter 13 debtors choosing to keep certain collateral uti
lized a process called “cramdown” to pay less than what they still
owed under the original contract.120 Essentially, debtors would
only have to pay what the collateral was worth, not the full amount
owed on the loan.121 Debtors could achieve this result by bifur
cating their loan into secured and unsecured sections.122 If a lender
was lucky enough to have a Chapter 13 debtor who owed less than
the vehicle was worth, that lender was oversecured.123 In this case,
the lender would be paid what was owed under the original loan
agreement.124 Because automobiles and other vehicles depreciate
rapidly, however, it was more likely that a debtor was left owing
more than what his vehicle was worth.125 In this case, a lender was
undersecured.126 Being undersecured meant that the “secured
creditor [could only] receive the value of the collateral at the time
of filing . . . plus interest.”127 In other words, the amount of the
obligation that equaled the value of the vehicle was treated as a
secured loan, while any amount in excess of the value was treated
as an unsecured obligation; this severely hampered the lender’s
ability to receive payment on that portion of the debt.128 In this
trouble and have terrible credit ratings, so that they may actually improve ac
cess to new credit by filing in bankruptcy.
Id. (footnote omitted).
120. For a discussion of BAPCPA’s effect on cramdown, see Rash and RideThrough Redux, supra note 20, at 464-65.
121. Id.
122. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006). When a debtor grants a security interest in collat
eral to a creditor, which is essentially a lien on the property, this is a secured loan.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1475 (9th ed. 2009).
123. Whitford, supra note 69, at 145.
124. Id.
125. The topic of valuation is outside the scope of this Note. For discussion of
how courts decide the value of vehicles in bankruptcy proceedings, both pre- and postBAPCPA, see Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 463-67.
126. Whitford, supra note 69, at 145.
127. Id. at 146.
128. See Richardo I. Kilpatrick & Marla A Zain, Selected Creditor Issues Under
the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, 79 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 817, 834 (2005); Whitford, supra note 69, 145-46.
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case, a lender must get in line with other unsecured creditors, mak
ing it unlikely that they would collect this portion of the debt.
BAPCPA changes how Chapter 13 functions with respect to
secured collateral such as automobiles. Section 1325(a) states that
[S]ection 506 shall not apply to a claim described [in paragraph 5]
if the creditor has a purchase money security interest securing the
debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within
the 910-day [sic] preceding the date of the filing . . . and the col
lateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for
the personal use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt con
sists of any other thing of value, if the debt was incurred during
the 1-year period preceding that filing.129

In cases where the debtor has acquired his vehicle within the
previous 910 days, that debtor will be forced to pay the full amount
owed under the secured agreement when filing under Chapter 13,
which is a definite improvement in creditors’ pre-BAPCPA position
with newer cars.
Chapter 13 debtors, “[a]lthough . . . well-meaning and optimis
tic” often did not complete their repayment plans prior to
BAPCPA.130 BAPCPA’s means test anticipated forcing more debt
ors to file under Chapter 13.131 With more debtors filing under
Chapter 13, especially when their first choice may have been to file
under Chapter 7, it appeared that there could be fewer bankruptcy
discharges.132 Indeed, as many as two-thirds of debtors who begin a
Chapter 13 plan are unable to complete it and obtain a discharge.133
3. BAPCPA’s Changes to Chapter 7 Provisions
BAPCPA introduced changes to Chapter 7 as well making it
more difficult for some debtors to file under Chapter 7, which was
the only option that provided any hope of a “ride-through” in the
first place.
129. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (2006). This is the “famous ‘hanging paragraph’” in the Code, coming right
after section 1325(a)(9), but having no designation of its own. David Gray Carlson, The
Res Judicata Worth of Illegal Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 351,
359 (2009). It is a prime example of the poor draftsmanship and editing that went into
BAPCPA.
130. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1297-98.
131. See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 459 n.9.
132. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1298 (“Now, Chapter 13 is less voluntary
and, for several reasons, even less promising as a way for debtors to deal effectively
with their problems.”).
133. Id. at 1297-98.
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The biggest change BAPCPA made affected which debtors
were eligible to file for Chapter 7 relief. In an effort to curb abuse
of the system, BAPCPA introduced a “means test” to determine the
eligibility of debtors to file under Chapter 7.134 If a debtor attempts
to file under Chapter 7 and has income in excess of the applicable
median family income for her state, that debtor will have to over
come a presumption of abuse.135 Courts may also look at “whether
the debtor filed the petition in bad faith”136 and at the “totality of
circumstances” in evaluating whether there is such abuse.137
BAPCPA requires looking at a debtor’s income, but his “current
monthly income” is calculated by looking at income over the previ
ous six months.138 Thus, a debtor may purposely make less in the
six months prior to filing.139 A debtor might also think ahead and
buy property on secured credit, which would be deductible from his
income.140 Ironically, BAPCPA may “make access to bankruptcy
difficult for all while permitting relatively well-off persons who plan
ahead to shelter both income and assets from their creditors.”141
Despite the many changes BAPCPA made to the Bankruptcy
Code, Congress did not change the “if applicable” language that
was the main source of controversy surrounding the previous ver
sion of the act as applied to the “ride-through” option for debtors
wishing to keep their automobiles.142 Since these words caused so
much contention and ambiguity, the drafting of BAPCPA would
134. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C. §
707(b)(2) (2006).
135. Id.; see DAVID J. LIGHT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY REFORM 2005 12
(LRP Publications ed., 2005) (“The purpose of the means test is to create a presump
tion of abuse.”).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(A). While “bad faith” is not defined in the Bank
ruptcy Code, a debtor who conceals assets is a prime example of a filer in “bad faith.”
See, e.g., Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007) (finding that
debtor who concealed a home in Maine had filed for Chapter 7 in “bad faith” and was
“not entitled to the relief available to the typical debtor”).
137. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3)(B).
138. Id. § 101(10A); A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1315.
139. A Fresh Start, supra note 90, at 1316 (“[A] small businessperson could simply take on less work for a period before filing, or an employee could take a lower
paying job for all or part of the six months before filing.”).
140. Id. (“[B]uying a new car or a bigger house is a way to pass the presumed
abuse test.”).
141. Id. at 1306. A new decision by the Supreme Court may allow Bankruptcy
courts to again use their discretion, however, by allowing them to take a more forwardlooking approach that considers expected events in the debtor’s life. See generally
Hamilton v. Lanning, 130 S. Ct. 2464 (2010).
142. 11 U.S.C. § 521.
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have seemed an opportune time to clarify this language.143 Yet,
Congress chose not to change these words, perhaps counting on
other changes to make its intentions regarding the “ride-through”
option clearer.
BAPCPA changed section 521(a)(2)(C) so that it now states
“nothing in subparagraphs (A) and (B) . . . shall alter the debtor’s
. . . rights with regard to such property . . . except as provided in
section 362(h).”144 Section 362(h)(1)(A) states that if a “debtor
fails . . . to file timely any statement of intention required under
section 521(a)(2) with respect to such personal property, or to indi
cate in such statement that the debtor . . . if retaining such personal
property, [will] redeem such personal property . . . [or] enter into an
agreement of the kind specified” the automatic stay will be
terminated.145
Section 362(h)(1)(B) does appear to give debtors the right to
reaffirm on the same agreement they had with a secured lender
before filing for bankruptcy.146 It provides that the automatic stay
will not be lifted in cases where a debtor attempts to reaffirm on the
original terms of the agreement and the creditor refuses.147 This
new language appears to protect both creditors and consumers.
Creditors will still have a secured loan agreement, making debtors
still personally liable for their debt if they choose to keep their vehi
cles. Debtors, on the other hand, while losing the benefit of keep
ing their vehicle without personal liability on the amount still owed,
as the “ride-through” allowed pre-BAPCPA, can avoid higher inter
est rates or other adverse changes to their agreements that creditors
may otherwise attempt to impose.148 This seems to be a win-win
situation, as it protects creditors from damage to, or loss of, the
collateral and it protects debtors from being forced into agreements
that are less favorable than the original agreement. As this Note
will argue, this solution fits well into an approach that looks at the
language and the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code.149
143. Werner, supra note 84, at 1.
144. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 362(h)(1)(A).
146. Id. § 362(h)(1)(B).
147. Id.
148. See Rash and Ride-Through Redux, supra note 20, at 478.
149. See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (consider
ing the purpose of bankruptcy law and not text alone); see also In re Dumont, 581 F.3d
1104, 1122 (9th Cir. 2009) (Graber, J., dissenting) (citing Marrama that the principal
purpose of the bankruptcy act is to provide a “fresh start”).

R
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III. THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS—HOW BAPCPA HAS
AFFECTED THE “RIDE-THROUGH” OPTION IN PRACTICE
BAPCPA has certainly affected how debtors and their attor
neys approach bankruptcy cases. It has also led to varied reasoning
among the courts as they try to interpret the new Code. Most
courts agree that BAPCPA ended the “ride-through” previously
available to debtors, at least in those circuits that allowed the op
tion and relied only on debtor silence to trigger its protection.
Circuits that had read the older version of the Code to disallow
consumer “ride-through” for automobiles were unlikely to change
their views under the new Code. The “if applicable” language that
these courts had understood as foreclosing the possibility of “ride
through” was still in place, and with the additional requirements of
section 362(h), it was doubtful these courts would change their
minds.
The circuits that had allowed the “ride-through” option to
debtors in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases have had the steepest learn
ing curve in applying the new Code.150 Nevertheless, some courts
have continued to allow at least a limited “ride-through.”151 While
these decisions are not based on the same reasoning as the courts
used to allow the “ride-through” pre-BAPCPA, they do offer a
more limited group of consumer debtors the same benefits.
When courts attempt to interpret BAPCPA they often look at
the plain meaning of the text to reach a determination of how each
section should be applied. This plain meaning approach, however,
was the leading cause of the pre-BAPCPA circuit split.152 With the
enactment of BAPCPA, courts are still unable to agree on the plain
meaning of sections relevant to this very important issue facing
debtors and creditors alike.
150. Cf. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104; Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. 161
(Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2008); In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008); In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. 225 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007); In re Ertha Rice, No. 06-10975 (JFK), 2007
WL 781893 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2007); In re Hue Huu Tran, No. 07-12512-SSM,
2007 WL 4210559 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 27, 2007); In re Husain, 364 B.R. 211 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2007); In re Lorenz, 368 B.R. 476 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007); In re Donald, 343
B.R. 524 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006); In re Hinson, 352 B.R. 48 (Bankr. E.D. N.C. 2006);
In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006); In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694 (Bankr.
D. Idaho 2006).
151. See Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 187-88; In re Chim, 381 B.R. at
199; In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. 434, 439 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2007); In re Husain, 364 B.R
219 n.15. But see In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007 WL 4210559, at *3 (granting debtor the
chance to amend the statement of intention to choose one of the listed options, but
holding that the “ride-through” no longer exists as a fourth option).
152. See supra note 25.
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A. Applying the 2005 Act to the “Ride-Through”: The Journey
So Far
Congress did not resolve the issue of whether the “ride
through” was still a viable option to some debtors.153 There is still
disagreement over a debtor’s options.154 For debtors, creditors, and
their attorneys, this has led to uncertainty. Prior to BAPCPA, ex
perienced attorneys could let prior decisions guide their actions on
behalf of their clients. After BAPCPA’s passage, it was up to the
attorneys to interpret the new provisions and advise their clients to
the best of their ability. Attorneys could no longer rely on their
own experience in this area of the law, and the courts could provide
no guidance at this early stage. Assumptions regarding the 2005
Act have led to decisions that have surprised consumers.155 Credi
tors were also in for some surprises.156
Many courts have decided that the new language in section
521(a) together with the addition of section 362(h) has eliminated
153. See In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1120 (Graber, J., dissenting).
The Fourth Circuit suggested simple alternative text that Congress could have
used if the options were exclusive . . . [yet t]he all-important “if applicable”
phrase—the very source of disagreement among . . . courts . . . remains intact.
Congress not only declined to adopt the . . . suggested text, it declined to make
any change whatsoever.
Id.
154. Compare In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108 (noting BAPCPA abrogated ridethrough of personal property), and In re Blakeley, 363 B.R. at 227-28 (holding that
BAPCPA has eliminated the ride-through), and In re Ertha Rice, 2007 WL 781893, at *1
(holding that BAPCPA “eliminated ride-through”), and In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 540
(“The court is convinced that termination of the ‘ride-through’ option is what Congress
intended.”), and In re Rowe, 342 B.R. at 345-46 (holding that there is no fourth option
post-BAPCPA), and In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. at 703 (holding that post-BAPCPA a
debtor may not choose a ride-through option), with Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R.
at 187-88 (holding that ride-through is available to some debtors), and In re Chim, 381
B.R. at 199 (holding that ride-through is available where the court rejects a reaffirma
tion agreement), and In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007 WL 4210559, at *2 n.2 (acknowledging
that BAPCPA “largely eliminate[d]” ride-through but noting Husain exception), and In
re Husain, 364 B.R at 219 (holding that even where reaffirmation is rejected by the
court a creditor may only repossess in the event of default), and In re Hinson, 352 B.R.
at 52 (holding that creditor could not repossess the car because the debtor offered to
reaffirm on original terms and was current).
155. In Dumont, for example, the debtor had her car repossessed with no warn
ing, several months after her discharge, and while she was making payments that the
creditor was silently accepting. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1104.
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6) (2006); In re Moustafi, 371 B.R. at 438 (creditor
was not allowed to repossess vehicle because it did not have an “allowed claim” for the
vehicle as technically required); see also Christopher M. Hogan, Will the Ride-Through
Ride Again?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 882, 914 (2008) (“Typically, for a claim to be allowed,
courts have ruled that a proof of claim must be filed, which does not occur in ‘no-asset’
Chapter 7 cases.”).
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the “ride-through” for Chapter 7 debtors.157 A secured creditor is
thus granted relief from the automatic stay if the debtor does not
choose one of the listed options—surrender, redemption, or reaffir
mation.158 On the other hand, while the “ride-through” is no
longer available as widely or easily as it was prior to the 2005 Act,
some courts have held it is still available.159 Now that courts have
begun devising new ways for debtors to take advantage of this op
tion, debtors and creditors alike will at least be able to move for
ward knowing what to expect.160 Since case law in this area is still
evolving, however, it may be some time before debtors and credi
tors are on as solid a footing as they were prior to BAPCPA’s
enactment.
1. Ipso Facto
BAPCPA removed one of the major obstacles creditors faced
prior to its enactment. Prior to 2005, creditors could not rely on
ipso facto clauses161 to give them any rights to collateral under the
Bankruptcy Code.162 BAPCPA changes that, as section 521(a)(6)
removes the automatic stay in cases where a debtor fails to meet the
157. See generally In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1108; In re Ertha Rice 2007 WL
781893, at *1; In re Donald, 343 B.R. at 540.
158. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(h)(1)(B), 521(a)(2); Fees v. Ford Motor Co., No. CV07
389-S-EJL, 2008 WL 4630668, at *4 (D. Idaho Oct. 17, 2008); In re Hue Huu Tran, 2007
WL 4210559, at *1; In re Rowe, 342 B.R. at 345-46.
159. See, e.g., Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 164-65 (allowing debtors to
keep their vehicle when the court refuses to approve their attempted reaffirmation with
creditor).
160. In both Coastal and Moustafi, for example, creditors did not file a “proof of
claim” because this was not a typical step taken in Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases. Coastal
Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176; In Re Moustafi, 371 B.R. at 438. According to these
courts, however, this step now was critical in order for creditors to have a chance at
reclaiming the collateral. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 178; In re Moustafi,
371 B.R. at 438; see also Hogan, supra note 156, at 914 (“Typically, for a claim to be
allowed, courts have ruled that a proof of claim must be filed, which does not occur in
‘no-asset’ Chapter 7 cases.”).
161. An “ipso facto clause” in a contract “specifies the consequences of a party’s
bankruptcy.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 905 (9th ed. 2004). Secured agreements will
often have such a clause stating that filing for bankruptcy is sufficient reason to cause
the filing party to be in default and to allow the creditor to repossess the collateral. See
Bob Eisenbach, Are “Termination on Bankruptcy” Contract Clauses Enforceable?, IN
THE (RED) THE BUSINESS BANKRUPTCY BLOG (Sept. 16, 2007), http://bank
ruptcy.cooley.com/2007/09/articles/business-bankruptcy-issues/are-termination-on
bankruptcy-contract-clauses-enforceable/.
162. See, e.g., Riggs Nat’l Bank of Wash. D.C. v. Perry, 729 F.2d 982, 985 (4th Cir.
1984) (holding that ipso facto clauses were unenforceable).
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requirements of section 524(c) or section 362(h).163 Section 521(a)
goes on to state that
[i]f the debtor fails to so act within the 45-day period referred to
in paragraph (6), the stay under section 362(a) is terminated with
respect to the personal property . . . which is affected, such prop
erty shall no longer be property of the estate, and the creditor
may take whatever action as to such property as is permitted by
applicable nonbankruptcy law.164

Thus, if a creditor has a default provision in its agreement with
the debtor, this clause may be enforced. Creditors must still comply
with applicable state laws, however, in any efforts to regain their
collateral.165
Prior to BAPCPA, section 365(e)(1)(B) of the Bankruptcy
Code prohibited secured lenders from deeming a contract in default
solely because the debtor had filed for bankruptcy.166 Section
521(d), however, provides that
[i]f the debtor fails timely to take the action specified . . . with
respect to property . . . as to which a creditor holds a security
interest . . . nothing in this title shall prevent or limit the opera
tion of a provision in the underlying . . . agreement that has the
effect of placing the debtor in default under such . . . agreement
by reason of . . . existence of a proceeding under this title.167

After BAPCPA, ipso facto clauses were no longer useless in
bankruptcy proceedings. Once the debtor fails to reaffirm or re
deem the vehicle, nothing in the Bankruptcy Code itself prohibits
the creditor from acting on the default provision in its contract with
the consumer that allows it to repossess the car.168 The secured
163. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(6).
164. Id. § 521(a).
165. See, e.g., In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 539 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006) (“Creditors
still must ensure that the contract . . . [complies with] any applicable state laws.”); In re
Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 351 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (discussing applicable state law regard
ing ipso facto provisions).
166. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1)(B) (2000) (amended 2006).
167. Id. § 521(d) (2006).
168. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2009). The court did caution,
however, that “where there is no ispo [sic] facto clause in the contract, [the BAPCPA
provision] does not allow [the secured] creditor to pencil one in.” Id. The court also
gave no credence to the debtor’s argument that a bankruptcy case was not a “proceed
ing” and would therefore not trigger section 521(d). Id. at 1117.
It would be bizarre if the right to declare someone in default on her car loan
depended on the happenstance of a proceeding (in the technical sense) being
initiated for whatever reason in her case . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the
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creditor still must comply with state law.169 However, “federal
bankruptcy law no longer prevent[s]” the repossession.170 What is
especially troubling about this change in the Bankruptcy Code is
that once this clause kicks in, the debtor may have no way to cure a
default, even if state law would normally provide her options to do
so.171
2. Coastal’s Surprise
The plain language of section 521(2) of the old Code led to
different interpretations among the courts.172 After BAPCPA’s
passage, a plain language reading of the statute has also led to dif
fering interpretations. This has, once again, led to confusion and
nonuniform application of the statute. Not only have courts looked
at the “if applicable” language in applying a plain meaning, but
courts have also applied a plain meaning to several other terms,
such as “allowed claim” and “purchase price.”173
The “ride-through” option is still available to some debtors in
some circuits. In Coastal Federal Credit Union v. Hardiman, the
district court held that a modified version of the “ride-through” was
available, at least for debtors without an attorney, if that debtor
“timely enter[ed] into a reaffirmation agreement concerning per
sonal property with their creditor and submit[ted it] to the bank
ruptcy court, but the bankruptcy court refuse[d] to approve the
reaffirmation agreement.”174 Coastal believed that the failure of
the court to find that the reaffirmation was in the debtors’ best in
terest meant that the automatic stay was lifted and that it could
debtor’s filing of a Chapter 7 petition initiates a ‘proceeding’ for the purposes
of section 521(d).
Id.
169. Id. at 1115.
170. Id.
171. The Fourth Circuit recently held that since BAPCPA ended the “ride
through,” a creditor had the right to repossess the debtor’s car without giving notice of
default and a right to cure required under state law, since the filing of the bankruptcy
petition, which caused the default, cannot be cured. In re Jones, 591 F.3d 308, 313 (4th
Cir. 2010).
172. Compare In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that debtor
must choose one of the listed options only “if applicable” and stating, “[w]e see no
reason to reach beyond this plain language”), with In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1384
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that debtor must choose one of the listed options based on the
plain language of the Bankruptcy Code).
173. Coastal Fed. Credit Union v. Hardiman, 398 B.R. 161, 178-84 (E.D.N.C.
2008) (using the plain meaning of the statute to require creditors meet the technical
requirements of having an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price”).
174. Id. at 165.
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repossess the car.175 The district court affirmed the decision of the
bankruptcy court and held that the automatic stay was still in
place.176 The district court, applying the reasoning of the bank
ruptcy court, reached this decision “[b]ecause court approval of a
reaffirmation agreement is not an element of [sections] 521(a)(2)
and 362(h)(1).”177 Although the reaffirmation was ultimately not
approved by the bankruptcy court, “the debtors complied with the
requirements of the Code by doing everything within their control
to reaffirm the debt to Coastal. While ‘ride-through’ is not a stand
alone option . . . it may, in limited circumstances, occur as a result
of a debtor’s attempt to reaffirm.”178
Coastal argued that the plain meaning of the applicable provi
sions should not apply because “they lead to absurd results, and . . .
they run manifestly counter to clearly expressed Congressional in
tent in BAPCPA’s legislative history.”179 The court rejected the ap
plication of the absurdity exception to the relevant provisions
because “[e]ven if the result compelled by the plain language is
‘anomalous,’ ‘unreasonable,’ or even ‘quite unreasonable,’ it must
stand if Congress could plausibly have made that choice.”180 The
court also rejected the intent exception proposed by Coastal, stating
“the intent exception does not apply merely because a statute ap
pears to be unreasonable in light of general bankruptcy policy.”181
In order to successfully show that the plain meaning is not what
Congress intended, “the party challenging the plain language must
affirmatively show that the plain language is demonstrably contrary
to the legislature’s intentions.”182
Section 521(a)(6) of the Code requires a creditor to have an
“allowed claim” for the “purchase price” of the collateral.183 Tech
nically, in order to have an “allowed claim,” a creditor must file a
“proof of claim,” something that was not done prior to BAPCPA in
Chapter 7 cases.184 Further, the “purchase price” for the collateral
175. Id. at 166.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 166-67.
179. Id. at 167.
180. Id. at 168 (quoting In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257, 267-68 (4th Cir.
2004)).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 521(a)(6) (2006).
184. Hogan, supra note 156, at 914.
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is technically the full amount for which the collateral is sold.185
Some courts, however, have found that these terms should not be
read literally.186
The Coastal court found that “purchase price” was different
from “purchase money security interest.”187 “Purchase price” only
applied to the full purchase price.188 This was a blow to secured
creditors of vehicles because once a creditor had received even one
payment on an auto loan, they no longer had a claim for the
“purchase price.”189 Under these plain meaning interpretations,
Coastal did not have an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price” as
required by section 521(a)(6).190 Applying the literal meaning to
these terms was not absurd, as Coastal contended.191
There are at least two possible purposes to be served in applying
the phrase “allowed claim” in section 521(a)(6) as written . . . .
First, filing a proof of claim will establish whether the creditor
has an ipso facto clause that it can invoke. Second, filing a proof
of claim will establish whether the underlying contract and lien
are valid, enforceable, and perfected.192

Congress could therefore plausibly “have chosen the statutory
language” in question.193 Coastal also argued that nowhere in the
Congressional record does it state that Congress meant this section
to apply only to “allowed claims.”194 The court reasoned, however,
185. Id.
186. In re Steinhaus, 349 B.R. 694, 706-07 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) (“[I]t appears
unmistakable that Congress drafted, or allowed to be drafted by others and then en
acted, provisions with ‘loose’ and imprecise language.”); In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341, 349
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2006) (finding that “the intentions of the drafters, rather than the strict
language, [should] control[ ]”).
187. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176. The court relied on the reason
ing in Donald, which noted that “Congress had used ‘purchase money security interest’
elsewhere in BAPCPA, but did not do so in section 521(a)(6) . . . . Congress knew how
to use commercial-law terms of art, and chose not to do so in section 521(a)(6).” Id.;
see In re Donald, 343 B.R. 524, 536-38 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2006).
188. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 176-77.
189. Id. at 168.
190. Id. at 178-80. But cf. In re Chim, 381 B.R. 191, 197 (Bankr. D. Md. 2008)
(assuming that creditor did have an “allowed claim” for the “purchase price”). See
generally In re Rowe, 342 B.R. 341 (interpreting what is meant by “allowed claim”).
191. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 178.
192. Id. The court also noted that, “[a]s [the judge] reasoned in Donald, ‘it is not
too much to require that the secured creditor file a proof of claim’ before it attempts to
take property from a debtor who is not behind on payments.” Id. (quoting In re Don
ald, 343 B.R. at 536).
193. Coastal Fed. Credit Union, 398 B.R. at 179.
194. Id.
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that Congress did not need “to clearly express its intent in favor of
the plain language in BAPCPA’s legislative history . . . . The plain
language in section 521(a)(6)—including the phrase ‘allowed
claim’—is the best evidence of Congress’ [sic] intent.”195
Concerning the “purchase price,” the court reasoned that Con
gress could have meant only “to curb the most abusive of bank
ruptcy practices: . . . enjoying the personal property [one has
purchased on credit] while making no payments whatsoever, and
then filing for bankruptcy immediately before repossession.”196
Therefore, the court found such a plain language reading plausible.
Coastal also tried to argue that it had not “entered into” an
agreement as required by section 362(h)(1)(a).197 The debtors con
tended that approval of the agreement by the court was not re
quired under the section, and that they had, therefore, “entered
into” an agreement as required.198 The court agreed with the
debtors.199
B. Words or Purpose? How to Fairly Apply the Code
There is debate over whether courts should look at a “plain
meaning” interpretation or whether courts should look at the pur
pose of the Bankruptcy Code.200 Traditionally, courts have inter
preted bankruptcy law according to its plain meaning.201 However,
choosing a strict interpretation without flexibility does not always
lead to fair results.
195. Id. at 179-80.
196. Id. at 180.
197. Id at 177.
198. Id.
199. Id.; see also In re Husain, 364 B.R 211, 218-19 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007) (con
cluding that reaffirmation agreement does not have to be enforceable for debtors to
satisfy meaning of “agreement” under BAPCPA).
200. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 350 (stating that in a 2007 decision, “the Supreme Court . . . sen[t] a strong message to lower courts to keep purposes
of bankruptcy law in the foreground as they interpret it”); Thomas F. Waldron & Neil
M. Berman, Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective Af
ter Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J 195, 202 (2007) (“Although the Su
preme Court has repeatedly resolved statutory interpretation issues involving
bankruptcy by reference to the ‘plain meaning’ of the text, a candid assessment of this
body of law finds confusion, if not contradiction, in the methodology of these
decisions.”).
201. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 352-53. The author “rejects the
notion that a good strategy for dealing with the 2005 law, with all its drafting problems
and empirically unsupported assumptions, is to latch onto ‘plain meaning,’ catching
Congress at its drafting errors and using them to try to help hapless debtors.” Id.
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1. The Supreme Court Speaks: Lessons From Marrama
In Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, a debtor sought
to convert his bankruptcy case from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13.202
Under section 706(a), a “debtor may convert a case under [Chapter
7] to a case under chapter . . . 13 of this title at any time.”203 The
debtor in this case was motivated to convert because he was caught
hiding the value of real property he owned, and Chapter 13 would
allow the debtor to keep this property while Chapter 7 would not.
Nevertheless, the debtor insisted that he had an absolute, one-time
right to convert his case to Chapter 13 under the Bankruptcy
Code.204 The First Circuit denied Marrama this right because he
had filed in bad faith.205 Bankruptcy courts have the power to dis
miss Chapter 13 filings “upon a showing of bad faith,” and the First
Circuit did not see why Congress would allow a debtor the “abso
lute right” to convert to Chapter 13 when the court could dismiss
the petition immediately.206 The Supreme Court agreed.207 The
Court looked to the purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code in deter
mining that Marrama was “not a member of the class of ‘honest but
unfortunate debtor[s]’” to be protected.208 Since his attempt to
hide property was “prepetition bad-faith conduct,” and since
“[b]ankruptcy courts . . . routinely treat dismissal for prepetition
bad-faith conduct as implicitly authorized,” Marrama would fail to
qualify as a debtor under Chapter 13.209 Section 706(d) denies a
debtor the right to convert “unless [he] may be a debtor under such
chapter.”210 Prior to the Court’s decision lower courts had dis
agreed about how to interpret the relevant sections.211
202. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 368-69 (2007).
203. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 706(a) (2006).
204. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370. This case was decided under the pre-BAPCPA
Code.
205. Id. at 365, 370. The Court in Marrama held that because the request to
convert was made in an attempt to hide property, and was thus in bad faith, granting the
request “would constitute an abuse of the bankruptcy process.” Id. at 369.
206. Id. at 370-71.
207. Id. at 371.
208. Id. at 374 (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991)).
209. Id. at 373.
210. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 706(d) (2006); see also Marrama, 549 U.S. at 373.
211. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 371; see 11 U.S.C. § 706(a) (“The debtor may convert
a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time
. . . . (emphasis added)); id. § 706(d) (“[A] case may not be converted to a case under
another chapter of this title unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.”
(emphasis added)).
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The Court stated, “[t]he principal purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code is to grant a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate
debtor.’”212 By stating the purpose of bankruptcy law from the
opening sentence, the Court illustrated that the purpose of bank
ruptcy law plays a crucial role in its interpretation.213 By referring
again to this purpose in holding that Marrama did not have the
right to convert his case to Chapter 13, despite the plain text of the
Code, the Supreme Court has made clear that courts should apply
rationality to their interpretation of the Code.214
In Marrama, the Court determined that inquiry should be
made into the legislative intent behind an act, and that this legisla
tive purpose should be the guiding principle used to determine the
proper reading.215 Unfortunately for courts looking to use
BAPCPA’s purpose to help them make sense of the Act, there is
little to assist them.216 According to the Ninth Circuit,
[T]he purposes of the bankruptcy code [do not] provide much
aid. Bankruptcy law serves two central but often conflicting in
terests . . . . [B]ankruptcy law aims to protect the “honest but
unfortunate debtor.” On the other hand, since ancient times,
bankruptcy has also been seen as promoting creditor interests as
well.217
212.
286-87).

Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367 (emphasis added) (quoting Grogan, 498 U.S. at

An issue that has arisen with disturbing frequency is whether a debtor who
acts in bad faith prior to, or in the course of, filing a Chapter 13 petition by, for
example, fraudulently concealing significant assets, thereby forfeits his right to
obtain Chapter 13 relief . . . . [S]ome courts have suggested that even a badfaith debtor has an absolute right to convert at least one Chapter 7 proceeding
into a Chapter 13 case even though the case will thereafter be dismissed or
immediately returned to Chapter 7. We granted certiorari to decide whether
the Code mandates that procedural anomaly.
Id. at 367-68.
213. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 356 (“The opinions in Marrama
show rather than tell lower courts and litigants that the Supreme Court, to a greater or
lesser extent, is nearly always likely to take a purposive approach to bankruptcy law
interpretation; even the dissenters . . . consider purpose.”).
214. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 370-71 (“We can discern neither a theoretical nor a
practical reason that Congress would have chosen to treat a first-time motion to convert
a chapter 7 case to chapter 13 under subsection 706(a) differently from the filing of a
chapter 13 petition in the first instance.”).
215. Id. at 371-72.
216. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting “that, in general,
legislative history is not an able guide here”).
217. Id. (citation omitted); see Grogan, 498 U.S. at 286-87.
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In Marrama, the Supreme Court emphasized the “purposes
and policy” of bankruptcy law to aid in its interpretation.218 The
Court used purpose, text, and congressional intent to reach its com
monsense conclusion, but it seemed to consider purpose fore
most.219 However, the Court has been inconsistent in the
methodology it has applied to bankruptcy cases.220 This means that
lower courts have not had a consistent example in interpreting
bankruptcy law.
Courts will make the fairest decisions when they look at the
text of the statute in light of congressional purpose and the policy
behind the Bankruptcy Code. Some experts think “that apparent
‘plain meaning’ should be checked against congressional purposes
and policy effects on the bankruptcy system . . . , and not just when
there is facial ambiguity in the text.”221 This might be taking the
Marrama decision too far, however, when there is no ambiguity in
the text. In cases where there is a question about the correct mean
ing of a provision, looking at the Code’s purpose may provide
courts with an equitable solution for both debtors and creditors.
This is especially critical to both debtors and creditors when it
comes to vehicles, which are one of the largest purchases consumers
will make in their lives. Debtors rely on their cars. Creditors do
not wish to lose valuable collateral to a debtor having no personal
liability, and thus no incentive to properly maintain the car.

218. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 350 (“The Court’s emphasis on
purposes and policy as the primary basis of interpretation, and its de-emphasis of statu
tory language, could not have come at a more dramatically significant time in the his
tory of bankruptcy law.”); Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367, 371-72.
219. Marrama, 549 U.S. at 367; A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 355
(“[T]he Court . . . de-emphasiz[es] the text of the statute itself, calling it merely ‘ade
quate authority’ for its conclusion.”).
220. A Guide to Interpretation, supra note 119, at 356. The author discusses another Supreme Court case in which the Court
insists that there is a “plain meaning” to a bankruptcy provision with a clear
drafting error as well as language that the majority concedes “may well be
surplusage” under the Court’s reading. The [Court] takes the position, how
ever, that when there is a choice between an interpretation of a statute that
treats part of it as surplusage and a reading that the statute is ambiguous, it is
preferable to find surplusage in order to conclude that there is a plain
meaning!
Id. at 356-57 (discussing Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 549 U.S. 526, 534-36 (2004)).
221. Id. at 357.
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2. The Ninth Circuit Weighs In: The Dumont Decision
The Ninth Circuit was the first appellate court to rule on the
“ride-through” issue after the passage of BAPCPA.222 In allowing
Ford Motor Credit Company to repossess a consumer’s automobile,
the court first looked to the plain meaning of the Code.223 The
court did not let plain meaning overrule commonsense, however.
The court agreed “that BAPCPA is hardly the very model of a welldrafted statute. However, it is our task to interpret the laws as
passed by Congress without attempting to force them to cohere
more than their words allow.”224 The Ninth Circuit also noted that
“[b]ecause of the importance of secured lending to the nation’s
economy, secured creditors have been the subject of particular con
gressional solicitude. This policy can be seen in other provisions of
BAPCPA, including one change which clearly reflects congressional
concern for auto lenders.”225 The court looked to the changes in
the cramdown provision of Chapter 13, which no longer allows
debtors who had purchased a vehicle within 910 days of filing to pay
the actual value of the vehicle.226 Instead, these debtors are respon
sible for the full purchase price of the vehicle.227
The Ninth Circuit looked to the United States Constitution to
“observe that congressional power over bankruptcy affairs is lim
ited by the constitutional requirement that the bankruptcy laws be
‘uniform.’”228 The court then concluded that Congress intended to
eliminate the “ride-through.”229
It would raise serious constitutional questions for us to conclude
that Congress affirmatively intended to promote the non-uniform
system caused by the circuit split over ride-through . . . . Given
the amendment of section 521(a)(2) and the enactment of section
362(h), it is unlikely that Congress failed to foresee that
BAPCPA would have a major impact on ride-through. Accord
ingly, we assume that Congress intended to make ride-through
available in all circuits, or none. The direction and tenor of the
222. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1104.
223. Id. at 1111.
224. Id. at 1110-11.
225. Id. at 1111.
226. Id.
227. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(5) (2006).
228. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress
the power “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout
the United States”).
229. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1112.
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changes, which place new duties on debtors and create new sanc
tions for failure to comply, suggest that Congress did not intend
to increase access to ride-through by passing BAPCPA.230

The court thus had no choice but to overturn its pre-BAPCPA
decision in In re Parker.231
In allowing the “ride-through” prior to BAPCPA’s passage, the
Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that section 521(2) stated that it did
nothing to change the rights of the debtor respecting the collat
eral.232 The court noted that a debtor must not only file a statement
of intention, but now the debtor “must indicate ‘either’ surrender
‘or’ retention and if he chooses the latter, he must indicate ‘either’
redemption [or] reaffirmation.”233 BAPCPA’s new language made
it clear to the Ninth Circuit that the “ride-through” was no more.
Antoinette Dumont, the debtor in question, had chosen the reten
tion option, but had failed to choose one of the listed alterna
tives.234 She instead continued making payments for several
months only to have her car repossessed without warning after her
discharge.235 The court concluded that the discharge injunction did
not protect her as a result of her failure to state one of the listed
intentions.236
The court in Dumont also relied on the fact that BAPCPA’s
changes expressly granted debtors an exception to application of
section 362(h) if the debtor attempted “to reaffirm on the original
contract terms but was unable to complete such a reaffirmation due
to the creditor’s refusal.”237
Ride-through is functionally indistinguishable from reaffirmation
on the original terms except for the lack of personal liability in
the former. The careful carve-out of reaffirmation on the con
tract terms—a return to the status quo ante bankruptcy—implies
that debtors who attempt to ride-through are subject to section
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1113. In Parker, the court found “that the only mandatory act is the
filing of the statement of intention.” In re Parker, 139 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998).
232. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2) (2000), amended by 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2) (2006).
233. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1109; 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(C) (2006); 11 U.S.C.
§ 362(h)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit also noted that “the ‘either . . . or’ disjunction has
always meant that one of the listed alternatives must be satisfied.” Id.
234. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114.
235. Id. at 1107.
236. Id. at 1114. The automatic stay remains in effect until a case is closed, dis
missed, or discharge is granted or denied. Upon discharge, there will be a new stay in
effect under section 524. See 11 U.S.C. § 524.
237. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114; 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)(1)(B).
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362(h). If ride-through existed, any lawyer who advised his client
to make a reaffirmation offer on the original contract terms
would be guilty of malpractice, and any bankruptcy judge who
approved such a reaffirmation from a pro se litigant would be
seriously derelict in his duties. For why would one ever choose
reaffirmation on such terms and thus incur the risk of personal
liability when one could safely achieve the same ends by ridethrough? . . . Congress presumably would not have created an
“exception” to provide access to an option all debtors had in the
first place.238

Looking at the statutory construction, the court then con
cluded that “ride-through” was not an option for a debtor making
no attempt to reaffirm her agreement with the creditor.239
The Ninth Circuit relied on Congressional intent to help make
its decision. The question raised by Judge Graber in her dissent,
however, is what part of the intent should be analyzed?240 Is it the
intent of Congress in making the bankruptcy law uniform, as the
majority concludes? Is it the intent of Congress relating to resolu
tion of the circuit split? Or is it the intent of bankruptcy law in
general?
Judge Graber argued that Congress did not change the “if ap
plicable” language of section 521(a)(2)(A) from the language of the
old section 521(2), even though it must have known of the existing
circuit split.241 “The legislative history is completely silent on the
issue [of ride-through], with nary a reference to the vigorous public
debate by the courts and commentators. In my view, the changes to
the text indicate an intent to perpetuate the extant circuit split, not
resolve it.”242
3. Moving Toward Uniformity
Traditionally, bankruptcy law has relied upon the plain lan
guage rule of statutory construction in interpreting its provisions.
This approach has led to mass confusion in interpreting what is con
sidered “plain language,” causing a disservice to debtors and credi
tors doing their best to understand their rights. Marrama can be
238. In re Dumont, 581 F.3d at 1114.
239. Id. at 1118.
240. Id. at 1119-22 (Graber, J., dissenting).
241. Id. at 1120-21.
242. Id. at 1120. The dissent also points out that more than one circuit had sug
gested language that Congress could have used to make its intentions regarding the
availability of the “ride-through” option clear. Id.; see In re Price, 370 F.3d 362, 371 (3d
Cir. 2004); In re Belanger, 962 F.2d 345, 348 (4th Cir. 1992).
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used to support the importance of considering purpose. Supporters
of such a reading would apply a commonsense approach.
For a not inconsiderable part of our history, the Supreme Court
held that the “letter” (text) of a statute must yield to its “spirit”
(purpose) when the two conflicted. Traditionally, the Court’s
“purposivism” rested on the following intuitions: In our constitu
tional system, federal courts act as faithful agents of Congress;
accordingly, they must ascertain and enforce Congress’s com
mands as accurately as possible . . . . Ordinarily, a statutory text
will adequately reflect its intended purpose . . . . It is said that
just as individuals sometimes inadvertently misstate their in
tended meaning, so too does Congress.243

In these cases, where commonsense dictates, courts must use
all tools necessary and available to reach a fair reading of the stat
ute. Following this reasoning, when confronted with such a “mis
statement,” it is up to the courts to try to apply the statute in
question in the way in which Congress intended.244
On the other side of the debate are those who believe that the
plain meaning of the statute should be honored. They argue that
“the final wording of a statute may reflect an otherwise unrecorded
legislative compromise” that the courts should not second-guess.245
Only a statute’s text, not its legislative history, is approved by both
the House and the Senate.246
Clearly, analyzing this issue from a plain meaning or an intent
standpoint is not enough. Looking at the words, intent, and the
overarching purpose of the Code, to give a fresh start to the “hon
est but unfortunate debtor”247 and balancing this with fairness to
creditors, as well, is the only way to reach a result that is predictable
and fair for all. If courts use this approach, debtors and creditors
243. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists From Purposivists?, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 70, 71-72 (2006) (footnote omitted).
244. Id. at 72 (“[T]he Court long assumed that when the clear import of a stat
ute’s text deviated sharply from its purpose . . . a judicial faithful agent could properly
adjust the enacted text to capture what Congress . . . intended . . . .”).
245. Id. at 74. “In place of traditional conceptions of ‘actual’ legislative intent,
modern textualists urge judges to focus on what they consider the more realistic—and
objective—measure of how a ‘skilled, objectively-reasonable user of words’ would have
understood the statutory text in context.” Id. at 75 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65
(1998)).
246. Waldron & Berman, supra note 200, at 204 (“[The] focus on purpose was
critiqued as inconsistent with the process the Constitution provides for a bill to become
law . . . .”).
247. Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007).
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would go into bankruptcy proceedings understanding their rights.
They would not have to fear courts interpreting provisions in crea
tive ways, leading to uncertainty and possible loss of valuable
property.
There is also a fine line between allowing people to make their
own decisions and being paternalistic. Debtors are entitled to make
their own decisions and their own mistakes. If a debtor who de
cides to file for bankruptcy has been able, despite her other finan
cial woes, to keep current on her automobile loan, then she should
be allowed to keep her car in most cases. It is likely that the debtor
has already been making sacrifices to do so; presumably she under
stands the consequences of her decision.
Yet at the same time, debtors whose bankruptcy schedules in
dicated that there is insufficient money in the budget to meet all of
their necessary living expenses while continuing to make car pay
ments may be unrealistic in attempting to hold on to an automo
bile.248 But this is precisely the type of debtor who may still get the
benefit of the “ride-through.” This seems like an absurd result. It
is hard to believe that Congress intended those debtors who might
have the hardest time continuing to make car payments to do so
without fear of repossession. Since Congress did not provide a rem
edy for this situation, however, this is exactly the strange result with
which we are left. Precisely that debtor who may be least able to
afford her vehicle gets to keep it per a nonrecourse loan with an
unwilling lender.
Secured creditors should be allowed to make their own deter
minations on how much risk they are willing to assume. Cars
should not take on such mythic proportions to consumers that they
are valued out of all relation with reality. Courts do take into ac
count, when approving or disapproving reaffirmation agreements,
how far the debtor works from home, whether there are children or
an ill family member involved, and other variables.249 These all fac
tor into the equation when courts make their decisions to approve
or deny reaffirmation agreements. Even when a court disagrees
248. When a debtor’s expenses exceed their income, a presumption of undue
hardship arises, and courts are likely to review any attempted vehicle reaffirmations
closely. See Lisa A. Napoli, Reaffirmation After the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention Con
sumer Protection Act of 2005: Many Questions, Some Answers, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 259,
264-68 (2007).
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c)(6)(A) (2006). The court must review reaffirmation
agreements for unrepresented debtors to determine such agreements are “not imposing
an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor.” Id. Further, the court
must determine that such agreement is “in the best interest of the debtor.” Id.
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with a debtor’s perceived ability to pay and the risk of being liable
for the full debt under reaffirmation, it may still approve an agree
ment when all factors are considered. There is a very fine line be
tween being too paternalistic and watching out for debtors who are
not sophisticated in bankruptcy and financial management in gen
eral. Pro se debtors, whose agreements courts must always review,
are the best example of this.
It is unclear what real effect denying a reaffirmation agreement
will have, even in places where the “ride-through” is not an option.
Secured lenders who are being paid may not feel motivated to re
possess.250 While debtors whose reaffirmations are denied may be
riskier, this risk might be worth it to a creditor whose only other
option is to get what it can after incurring the costs of repossession.
It is a gamble that could well pay off if a debtor manages to at least
pay more than what the vehicle would fetch at auction.
The downside is that debtors like Dumont, who may be strug
gling to make payments they can ill afford to begin with, may end
up throwing that money away when they wake up months later to
find their car unexpectedly gone. This leads to the debtors living
with the same financial anxiety they had prior to filing, however,
and is not very conducive to a “fresh start.” Maybe bankruptcy
should cost consumers this price in exchange for forgiveness of their
debts. This is nothing new for debtors living in non-“ride-through”
states, after all. Perhaps Chapter 13 is a better option for those who
are unwilling to live with such uncertainty while still retaining their
cars.
There is no easy solution. Nevertheless, it seems that the
“ride-through” is ended with the passage of BAPCPA. Looking at
the relevant sections together, the intent seems clear. If debtors are
allowed to keep their cars with the protection of the automatic stay
when their reaffirmation is not in their best interest, more harm
than good may result. Who knows where else the debtors are cut
ting corners, perhaps on healthcare or food, in order to keep what
is, after all, just an object.
Most of all, commonsense tells us there must be some reason
to go through the reaffirmation process—one that makes the
debtor aware of the consequences of her actions. Why does section
250. Repossession costs creditors about $8000 per vehicle. Behind on Car Pay
ments? BBB Advice on How to Avoid the Repo Man, BETTER BUSINESS BUREAU (Sept.
4, 2009), http://centralflorida.bbb.org/WWWRoot/preview.centralflorida.bbb.org/
article/behind-on-car-payments-bbb-advice-on-how-to-avoid-the-repo-man-12364.
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524(k) dictate all the precise language that must be included in such
agreements if it does not matter?251 It seems that, sparse legislative
history or not, looking objectively at all these sections put together,
the next move after reaffirmation is denied should be decided by
the creditor. Just as giving up nonexempt assets is the price a Chap
ter 7 debtor must pay to be given her “fresh start,” this is another
consequence of having her other debts wiped out.
CONCLUSION
It seems that courts interpreting BAPCPA will still face chal
lenges, as there are so many ways to interpret what is supposedly
“plain language.”252 Courts relying solely on a “plain meaning” in
terpretation may circumvent even Congress’s known intentions by
using their own words against them. As courts struggle to apply the
Code, it is clear that relying on the “plain meaning” has not served
bankruptcy law well, and has lead to uncertainty on the part of
debtors and creditors. By looking instead to the purpose behind
the Bankruptcy Code, and using it to fairly interpret the provisions
of the Act, courts may have an opportunity to provide more gui
dance for those impacted by bankruptcy law.
Keeping their vehicles is critical for some debtors to get the
“fresh start” that bankruptcy promises. There is a potential resolu
tion to the “ride-through” issue that has split the courts for so long;
courts must interpret BAPCPA in a way consistent with its name.
Such an interpretation would strike a balance between those who
would provide debtors with the option of keeping their vehicles as
long as they are and remain current on their payments, and those
who think it is only fair that creditors should have more protection
for such a potentially valuable piece of secured property. The
251. 11 U.S.C. § 524(k) (giving detailed requirements for creditor disclosure in
reaffirmation agreements).
252. See Napoli, supra note 248, at 261.
It will be interesting to see whether courts that have been instructed to strictly
follow the plain language of the statute adhere to that rule in interpreting the
new provisions, leaving it to Congress to fix any mistakes. Of course, some
judges who profess to follow that method of statutory interpretation seem to
do so only when it brings about the result they desire.
Id. (quoting Henry J. Sommer, Trying to Make Sense Out of Nonsense: Representing
Consumers Under the “Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005”, 79 AM BANKR. L.J. 191, 192 (2005)). On the other hand, this author points out
that a “redeeming fact [of the Act] is that the legislation will not be interpreted or
implemented by those who wrote it, but rather by reasonable human beings.” Id.
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Ninth Circuit, although denying the debtor the ability to keep her
car, got it right.
Allowing debtors the “ride-through” option only when a credi
tor refuses to reaffirm on the same terms forestalls creditors from
taking advantage of consumer debtors. By forcing debtors to reaf
firm and still be personally liable for this debt if they wish to retain
their vehicle, debtors cannot take the easy way out and take advan
tage of creditors. Courts that look to the congressional purpose in
revising the Bankruptcy Code, as well as to the purpose of bank
ruptcy law in general, will create a solution that is as close to opti
mal as possible under the circumstances. It may not be a perfect
system, but it is as good as it gets on this side of the looking glass.
Allyson MacKenna*
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